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Scientists and non-scientists alike have always shown 
great interest in how the human mind regulates behavior 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). This interest 
goes back to the ancient philosophers and writers, includ-
ing Confucius, Plato, and Ovid. Nowadays, psychologists 
typically attribute adaptive behavior to an executive sys-
tem, which can override impulsive or inappropriate 
actions, allowing people to fulfill long-term goals. In con-
temporary Western societies, executive control (or a lack 
of it) has been linked to physical and mental health out-
comes, school and job success, substance (ab)use, and 
personal finances (Moffitt et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
idea that people have voluntary control over their 
impulses and actions permeates our current social sys-
tems (Logan, 2003). Thus, executive control is critical in 
everyday life. Nevertheless, this aspect of human func-
tioning has proven to be one of the most difficult issues 
to understand. In this article, I will provide a selective 
review of research on executive control of actions (for 
in-depth discussions and detailed overviews, see the Rec-
ommended Reading list). I will primarily focus on the 
stopping of inappropriate or impulsive actions (i.e., 
response inhibition). Stopping is generally considered a 
simple but extreme act of executive control, and has 
proven to be an excellent case study.
Mechanisms of Executive  
Action Control
Historically, control of impulsive or inappropriate actions 
was attributed to an intentional and rational executive-
control system that regulated a lower-level automatic and 
emotionally charged system. However, recent findings 
have suggested that this strictly hierarchical view is incor-
rect. Instead, action control seems to emerge from a 
highly interactive network with no clear boundaries 
between “higher-level” and “lower-level” systems. Never-
theless, the traditional dual-systems accounts still prevail 
in the wider literature.
How to control impulsive or 
inappropriate actions
In the past two decades, great efforts have been made to 
fractionate the executive controller into distinct control 
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functions (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). But too often 
researchers label operations as “executive” without fur-
ther questioning the nature of the underlying processes. 
Consequently, they often fail to explain how behavior is 
regulated in complex environments. Progress on the con-
trol problem requires a more precise approach.
Researchers should focus on the building blocks of 
action control. It is generally accepted that acting or 
responding to a stimulus involves different processing 
stages (e.g., Sternberg, 1969). Similarly, action control in 
response to changes in the environment or internal state 
involves a chain of basic processes that results in the 
inhibition of a response and the activation of an alterna-
tive one (Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). For 
example, the first step of various forms of action control, 
such as stopping, involves detecting relevant information 
that signals the need for control; these signals can be 
external (e.g., a red traffic light) or internal (e.g., a sud-
den thought or conflict between various response 
options). Next, an appropriate action (e.g., stopping) 
needs to be selected or retrieved from memory. Finally, 
the selected action (e.g., pressing the brake pedal) has to 
be executed quickly but accurately.
These basic control processes are inherently competitive 
and interactive. The competition idea has received support 
from behavioral, neuroscience, and computational studies. 
For example, when neural activity associated with one 
visual stimulus increases, activity associated with other con-
current stimuli decreases (Duncan, 2006). This could also 
explain why people find it difficult to attend to more than 
one stimulus or do more than one thing at the same time. 
The interactive idea has received support from recent stud-
ies, including from my own lab. A prominent model of 
response inhibition and executive control, the independent-
race model, assumes that executive-control processes (stop) 
and lower-level processes (go) are independent (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984). However, we found strong dependence 
between go and stop processes when task difficulty was 
manipulated (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). Other studies 
have also observed brief moments of interaction in easier 
response-inhibition tasks (e.g., Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & 
Schall, 2007). Thus, action control seems to emerge from a 
competitive and interactive network, rather than from an 
independent top-down control system that oversees and 
alters ongoing processing in lower-level systems.
Bias and anticipatory control
Often people must find a delicate balance between com-
peting task demands. Focusing on a single stimulus could 
lead to overly rigid behavior, whereas the constant reori-
enting of attention could lead to constant distraction. 
Similarly, responding quickly in the currently relevant 
task (e.g., driving home) can lead to fast task completion, 
but it reduces the likelihood that an action can be stopped 
or replaced in response to unexpected changes in the 
environment (e.g., a child crossing the street).
Such a balance can be achieved by biasing stimulus or 
response competition in advance. For example, when the 
organism predicts the occurrence of a stimulus (e.g., based 
on previous experiences or external cues, such as a traffic 
warning sign), it can pre-activate the relevant visual cells, 
biasing neural competition in favor of the expected stimulus 
(e.g., Duncan, 2006). Similarly, when the system predicts 
certain actions, it can pre-activate the motor network, bias-
ing action selection and reducing the response latency of 
the anticipated action (e.g., Bestmann, 2012).
The biasing idea can account for a range of phenomena 
in the control literature. For example, we proposed a gen-
eral biasing account for proactive inhibitory control 
(Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016). When 
subjects are informed that they may have to stop a response 
in the near future, they typically slow down (Aron, 2011; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). Our results indicated that pro-
active inhibitory control works by biasing or altering (neu-
ral) activity in lower-level systems that are involved in 
stimulus detection, action selection, and action execution. 
For example, subjects monitored for perceptual features of 
the stop signal in stop contexts. They also traded speed in 
the go task for success in the stop task. These findings are 
consistent with work in the wider attention and executive-
control literature (see Elchlepp et al., 2016, for a discussion). 
Furthermore, we found that subjects made similar proactive-
control adjustments in a task in which they occasionally had 
to execute an additional response (instead of stopping a 
response). Finally, we observed an overlap between proac-
tive inhibitory control and proactive control in task-
switching studies (i.e., preparation for upcoming tasks; 
for reviews on task switching, see Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). These 
findings led us to conclude that all forms of proactive con-
trol require reconfiguration or biasing of task settings (e.g., 
which stimulus to attend to, which response to execute, 
etc.). Thus, the most important difference between tasks or 
contexts is which processing systems are adjusted, rather 
than which adjustment mechanisms are involved (Elchlepp 
et al., 2016; for a similar argument, see Logan, Van Zandt, 
Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014).
When attention is proactively allocated and responses 
are prepared, behavior may not require much control 
anymore; instead, responses could be activated easily by 
stimuli in the environment (Meiran, Cole, & Braver, 2012). 
Indeed, response inhibition can be triggered by task-
irrelevant primes (e.g., van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den 
Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009a), but these priming effects are primarily observed 
in contexts in which subjects are instructed to stop occa-
sionally (Chiu & Aron, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). 
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These findings are consistent with the prepared-reflex 
idea: Once subjects have made proactive-control adjust-
ments in anticipation of a stop signal, the stop response 
can be activated easily by both task-relevant and task-
irrelevant information in the environment.
Influences of the recent past
Performance monitoring is a critical component of action 
control (Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014). For 
example, people often slow down after they make an 
error. This slowing is usually attributed to the executive 
system: When it detects an error or suboptimal outcome, 
it adjusts the parameters of perceptual and response sys-
tems to reduce the likelihood of future errors. Thus, errors 
or suboptimal outcomes can signal the need for extra 
control. Consistent with this idea, subjects often slow 
down after an unsuccessful stop. However, slowing has 
been observed after successful stopping as well. This led 
Bissett and Logan (2012) to conclude that stop-signal pre-
sentation encourages subjects to shift priority from the go 
task to the stop task (i.e., it biases competition). Such a 
shift produces longer response latencies after a signal 
trial and can reduce the latency of the stop process.
Recent events can influence actions in other ways as 
well. When people perform an action, they store infor-
mation about the stimulus, the task, the selected action, 
and possibly the control settings in memory (Egner, 2014; 
Logan, 1988). When the stimulus is repeated, this infor-
mation is retrieved. This could explain why people are 
often slower to respond to a stimulus that was previously 
presented in a different task context or that was previ-
ously paired with another response or with stopping.
Another source of sequential effects is residual activa-
tion in perceptual or motor systems. For example, we 
found that excitability of the motor system was associ-
ated with the response properties of the previous experi-
mental trial (Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, 
Stevens, & McLaren, 2016). In competitive systems, small 
activation differences at the beginning of a trial could 
make the difference between whether or not a response 
is selected. The same study showed that previous events 
influenced actions even if this went against conscious 
expectancies about upcoming events. Proactively biasing 
response options is effortful (Braver, 2012). Thus, even 
though people can predict what will happen next, they 
may not always adjust their behavior accordingly. This 
could explain why recent events can influence our 
behavior, even when this is inappropriate.
Learning and development at the 
heart of executive control
A main executive-control function is biasing activity 
based on rules, expectancies, or task goals. But how do 
people know which options or processing pathways to 
bias? Some progress has been made in answering this 
question. For example, Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, 
and O’Reilly (2005) developed a neurologically inspired 
model of rule learning and control. The model was 
trained to respond to multidimensional stimuli. In each 
block, only one dimension was relevant (e.g., color), but 
the specific features within the dimension could change 
(e.g., red, green, yellow). Throughout the block, the pre-
frontal cortex system developed patterns of activity that 
encoded abstract representations of the relevant stimulus 
dimension (e.g., “color”). These abstract rule-like repre-
sentations subsequently guided behavior by providing 
excitatory support for the relevant dimension in the 
stimulus-processing layers; in other words, they biased 
competition. This was possible because links between the 
abstract representations and the processing layers were 
built during training (note that a similar principle could 
explain how stimuli, cues, or task contexts can become 
associated with control settings, as described above).
Other work has indicated that acquired representa-
tions (and the links between the representations and pro-
cessing layers) can be reused with a variety of other 
representations; furthermore, they can be reapplied in 
different contexts (Cole, Laurent, & Stocco, 2013). This 
could explain people’s ability to rapidly learn new action 
rules from instructions and show adaptive behavior in 
novel situations.
But learning also influences performance in a stimulus-
specific way. Logan (1990) suggested that the stimulus-
response bindings (as described above) could be the first 
step toward automatization. Consistent with this idea, our 
work suggests that executive control of impulsive and 
inappropriate actions can become progressively more 
“automatic” throughout practice (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008). In a series of studies, we have demonstrated that 
people learn to associate specific stimuli with different 
aspects of stopping (for a discussion of what is learned, 
see Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 
2014). When the stimulus is repeated, these associations 
are retrieved, and the stop network is activated automati-
cally. This work is theoretically relevant because it shows 
that “executive” functions, such as response inhibition, 
can become automatized. It also has practical implica-
tions. Recent meta-analyses have indicated that stimulus-
specific stop training can influence food and alcohol 
consumption (e.g., Jones et al., 2016). Thus, outsourcing 
control to the environment may help people regulate 
their actions.
Integrating the learning and control literatures may 
also provide new insights into the development of execu-
tive control. The ability of children to control their actions 
improves remarkably from infancy through adolescence 
to adulthood. Several key transitions have been identi-
fied, such as from reactive to proactive control,1 from 
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externally driven to self-directed control, and from 
stimulus-driven to rule-based behavior (Munakata, Snyder, 
& Chatham, 2012). The work discussed above indicates 
how children can go from implementing specific stimu-
lus-response associations to general rules: Children may 
gradually develop abstract representations through con-
stant interaction with their environment and associate 
these with relevant behavior (i.e., they may learn that 
similar objects or situations require a similar response). 
Such abstract representations can subsequently guide or 
contextualize stimulus detection, action selection, and 
action execution.
Interim conclusions
The work reviewed above indicates that control of impul-
sive or inappropriate actions involves a chain of pro-
cesses that occur on different time scales. Researchers 
should explore at which of the processing stages situa-
tional, individual, or group differences arise. Further-
more, there is no clear distinction between “controlled” 
(or “goal-directed”) and “automatic” processes. For exam-
ple, automatic processes can be goal-directed and are 
influenced by task context (Ridderinkhof, 2014), whereas 
the prepared-reflex and associated-learning work has 
shown that some “control” processes (e.g., stopping) can 
operate in a (semi-)automatic way. Finally, other research 
not reviewed here has suggested that emotion and moti-
vational processes can have a strong influence on execu-
tive control (e.g., Braver et al., 2014). Combined, these 
findings indicate that control of impulsive actions arises 
from a highly interactive network with multiple compo-
nents and influences, rather than from two separate sys-
tems that operate in parallel.
Future Directions and Challenges
A main challenge for future research is to describe how 
executive control emerges from an interactive and com-
petitive network. Furthermore, it remains unclear how 
individuals build up a control repertoire throughout 
development and what is learned when people control 
their actions. Finally, models of control assume that pro-
cessing is biased based on rules or (task) goals. But how 
are these rules or goals selected? In the case of externally 
driven control, the answer is usually straightforward (e.g., 
a parent giving instructions). For internally driven con-
trol, the answer is less obvious, although some progress 
has been made in tackling this issue (Ridderinkhof, 2014). 
Ultimately, progress on the control problem will require 
addressing fundamental questions about the nature of 
volition and intentionality.
Significant progress in understanding executive con-
trol will also require new models that integrate different 
disciplines and literatures. Behavior is controlled not just 
by the “self” but also by society. First, society dictates 
what should be controlled. Children’s behavior is initially 
regulated via external controllers (e.g., parents or teach-
ers). By the time they reach adulthood, most people have 
learned what behavior is acceptable and what should be 
inhibited (e.g., taboos2 or drug consumption). Second, 
society can influence how urges and impulses are con-
trolled. Proactive forms of control (i.e., regulating the 
environment or behavior before the actual impulse or 
urge arises) are likely to be significant determinants of 
impulsive and problematic behaviors (e.g., substance 
misuse) in the real world. Society can fulfil such a proac-
tive role by regulating the environment (e.g., by enforc-
ing plain cigarette packaging). Third, society determines 
to a certain degree how we define (perceived) impulse-
control problems. For example, certain forms of impul-
sive behavior (e.g., attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
and substance misuse) are now understood in some soci-
eties as neurological disorders, best treated with medica-
tions. This raises fundamental questions about volition 
and responsibility (disease vs. lifestyle choice). Impor-
tantly, beliefs about agency, self-control, and “free will” 
can have a strong impact on control processes and 
behavior itself (Rigoni, Braem, Pourtois, & Brass, 2016).
Executive control is also shaped by genetic evolution. 
Different species (e.g., birds, lemurs, and monkeys) can 
perform tasks in which they have to suppress inappropriate 
actions, indicating that executive control has evolved across 
species (MacLean et al., 2014). This finding undermines the 
traditional belief that executive control is a uniquely human 
trait that distinguishes us from “impulsive” animals. How-
ever, we don’t have a coherent account of the bio-evolution 
of executive control yet. In addition to genetic evolution, a 
second mechanism of inheritance, culture, gives rise to 
social norms, rules, and laws that have developed and 
changed throughout history. Therefore, we also have to 
study differences across time, space, and species and 
explore the origin and consequences of such variations.
Conclusion
I propose that executive control of actions arises from a 
chain of interactive and competitive processes. Further-
more, I argue that executive control is strongly influenced 
by events in the past, by the broader context in which the 
individual operates, and by biocultural evolution. Even 
though most researchers will agree that mental functions 
such as executive control are influenced by the environ-
ment and by evolution, the various external and internal 
influences are rarely discussed together. Only when we 
understand the interaction between individuals and their 
environment can we have a really satisfactory theory of 
executive control.
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Notes
1. Some have argued that when people age, control shifts again 
from proactive control to reactive control; this shift may account 
for age-related differences between young and older adults in a 
variety of executive-control tasks (Braver, 2012).
2. Neuroimaging findings suggest that taboo words activate 
parts of the neural network that is involved in canceling actions 
in response to external signals (Severens, Kühn, Hartsuiker, & 
Brass, 2011)
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